Tuesday, July 16, 2013

Back up & Running

Apologies to all but I have been buried in my research for the book and my work (got to make a living) To be honest I had switched emails and completely lost track of emails and passwords connected to this blogger account.  But at the 11th hour I was able to rescue the account and have updated the email and password information so I can post regular updates on the book like I intended when I created the blog over a year ago.

Book news: Chapter 1 "Founding And Development Of Military Aviation In The Central Powers Prior To The War" is essentially complete. If I were to put a number on it I'd say 90-95%.  There is several sources I am waiting in the mail to complete the Bulgarian and Ottoman Turk subsections but other than that Chapter 1 is complete.  I will post a sample from it later in the week after I scan and upload several organizational tables that will be included in the text. 

I am feverishly working on Chapter 3 "Air Operations During Battle Of Frontiers and The Marne Campaign August-September 1914".  The best work on the subject I have seen is a 1939 book by Elard von Loewenstern entitled "Mobilization And Deployment Of Flying Troops In August 1914" The book has never been translated to English and I am currently in the process of negotiating a professional to translate it for me.  In the mean time, I am using 12 unique sources from within the Ferko Collection inside the UT-Dallas Special Collections Department air archives & the 1942 book "The Air Weapon 1914-1916" by John Cuneo.  The book is part 2 of a series called "Winged Mars" and is devoted primarily to the operational & tactical history of the German Air Forces.  The fact that part 2 ends in the winter of 1916 and there is no part 3 to cover 1917 and 1918 raises alot of questions.. I know very little abut Cuneo and do not know if he was called to service in WW2 or was otherwise killed before completing part 3 covering 1917-1918. Whatever the reason, it is a shame because the book on 1914-16 is very well done. The only book of it's kind in the English language  giving a grand operational scale account of air operations instead of the usual "unit or personal histories". While useful, these histories must be put together to gain any sense of what is going on at the operational level. 

Cuneo's book, published in 1942, covers the grand tactical/operational level history of the Luftstreitkrafte 1914-1916. There has never been an operational level history of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman Turk and Bulgarian Air Forces for the entire war; 1914-1918. This is the reason why I firmly believe my work is so important and I devote all free time and energies to this endeavor.

A sample of Chapter 1 with the organization charts and several photos that will be used with the corresponding text will be posted at the end of the week.
I have ordered the newly published book "Above Ypres: The German Air Force in Flanders 1914-1918" By Bernard Deneckere and will review it on here as soon as I get it. 
 I am currently re-reading Sewell Tyng's "Campaign Of The Marne"; the book is the best Campaign level study of any campaign of any war I have ever read.. if you have not read the book you must.. Im not exactly sure of the details but I believe it was voted top 50 non-fiction books of all time and is very deserving.  
I just finished both of Terence Zuber's August 1914 books.. "Mons Myth" & "Battle of Frontiers".. the books described the various battles from the German point of view giving incredible detail of the various engagements. (division,brigade,regiment,battalion,company & even platoon level descriptions are throughout the books) Using regimental histories among other reliable sources, the book destroys false conclusions of the battle and for the first time tells the truth of why the German troops were superior to the French & British. Better training and tactics are the key reasons. The failure for German defeat in the Marne Campaign is not at the Division Corps or even Army Command levels... instead defeat can only be blamed on Supreme Command. Unlike Joffre, who hired the Paris Grand Prix winner as his personal driver and was constantly visiting Army, Corps and even Division HQs.. getting up to the date information and altering strategy accordingly.  Moltke on the other-hand stood idle in Luxembourg while the western armies were heavily engaged.  On several occasions Moltke didn't even communicate with army commanders while the armys were enageged and the fate of the empire was in the balance.  It is Moltke's lack of a guiding hand that resulted in the various Army commanders.. not having the overall picture were making decisions based on what was going on in their sector and they did the best they could.  If the army leaders like Bulow and Kluck were informed of the overall picture they would have certainly acted differently than they did.  It can easily be argued if they had the overall strategic information.. the right wing armys could have ended the war in September.  

Again the Chapter 1 sample will be up later in the week. 

-Matt Bowden-
Arlington Tx CSA

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